This book results from a group meeting held at the Institute for Scientific Exchange in Torino, Italy. The central aim was for scientists to think together in new ways with those in the humanities inspired by quantum theory and especially quantum brain theory. These fields of inquiry have suffered conceptual estrangement but now are ripe for rapprochement, if academic parochialism is put aside. A prevalent theme of the book is a moving away from individual elements and individual actors acting (...) upon each other, toward a coordinate hermeneutic dynamics that manifests as a coherent totality. Among the topics covered are image in photography and in neuroscience; language; time; brain and mathematics; quantum brain dynamics and quantum communication.". (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Francisco Javier ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, Norme, giudici, Stato costituzionale. Frammenti di un modelo giuridico, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2020, 221 pp.

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper examines the different discourses adopted concerning the climate change-migration nexus within the European Parliament (EP). It uses a critical discourse analysis approach to analyse a specific motion for resolution report, its amendments, and plenary debates, as well as an expert interview with the rapporteur to gain further insights into the political dynamics and challenges involved in the process. An own-initiative report is chosen for the analysis to reveal conflicting discourse-making processes between various political groups within the EP and (...) to better understand the role of the EP in the legislative branch of the European Union. It is found that political ideology plays an influential role. Even though political groups agree on the aims of the report, they constantly debate and use amendments to change content and extent. Therefore, we claimed that political discourses in a parliamentary setting should be analysed by specifically evaluating diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational arguments of discourses. (shrink)

A dor do ponto de vista clínico é definida como estímulo e resposta a partir de fenômeno biológicos complexos e subjetivos nas dimensões sensorial-discriminativa, afetivo-motivacional e cognitivo-avaliativo. Sua definição tem sido um desafio ao longo da história, desde a sua percepção como uma experiência espiritual e mística nos primórdios tempos, até o seu entendimento em termos biológicos como uma sensação física e mecânica que passa pelas fibras e alcança o cérebro. A dor é um efeito extremamente necessário uma vez que (...) é um sinal de alarme de que algum dano ou lesão está ocorrendo, embora a dor possa também estar presente na ausência de qualquer estímulo, dano ou doença detectável. Preponderantemente a dor é eliminada uma vez que o estímulo nocivo é removido, no entanto, a dor pode persistir apesar da remoção do estímulo e cicatrização aparente do tecido sendo denominada de dor crônica, com influência multidimensional. O limiar de dor fisiológico é definido como o ponto ou momento em que um dado estímulo é reconhecido como doloroso, o que pode variar de um indivíduo para o outro, e ainda estar associado as experiências prévias com lesão tecidual real ou potencial e a fatores psicológicos. Dessa forma, esta análise aborda a etimologia, histórico e evolução na concepção da definição da dor do ponto de vista clínico baseada na antiga e recente definição de dor pela Associação Internacional para Estudos da Dor frente ao contexto biológico que inevitavelmente é influenciado pelas condições psicossociais. Pode-se finalmente, estabelecer que há fortes indícios de associação entre lesão tissular e dor biológica com o sofrimento, comportamentos dolorosos e incapacidade. É evidente que o sofrimento e o comportamento originados a partir da dor do ponto de vista clínico, não se devem inteiramente à nocicepção originada por uma lesão tissular, pois os comportamentos dolorosos podem perpetuar-se em decorrência de fatores ambientais e de influências que não podem ser objetivamente avaliadas. A partir desse contexto, os bons programas de controle de dor devem ter uma abordagem cognitivo-comportamental e incorporar estratégias terapêuticas físicas, farmacológicas e psicológicas. Nenhum tratamento isolado é tão eficaz para a redução da dor crônica refratária como a conduta multidisciplinar. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.

A directory of archives and manuscript repositories, with links to web pages for the repositories and to online finding aids. Searchable by: collection name; city; state; National Inventory of Documentary Sources (NIDS) number; and National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC) number.

Est-il possible de trouver une herméneutique œcuménique pour que toutes les confessions chrétiennes puissent lire les Saintes Ecritures ensemble ? C'est à cette question que tente de répondre l'A. dans cet article. Après avoir formulé précisément la nature de sa problématique théologique en introduction, l'A. axe sa première partie sur l'état actuel de la question posée. En seconde partie, il propose un modèle possible d'herméneutique transconfessionnelle. En dernière partie, il procède à une étude comparative entrre les diverses confessions sur la (...) réflexion scripturaire. (shrink)

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)